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ANDREW P. VANCE MEMORIAL 
WRITING COMPETITION WINNER 
 
FACILITATING INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: THE U.S. NEEDS FEDERAL 
LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS 
J. Noelle Hicks∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
N a decision dictating the United States’ (“U.S.”) policy on 
upholding forum selection clauses in international business 
contracts,1 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he 
expansion of American business and industry will hardly be 
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a 
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our 
laws and in our courts.”2  Chief Justice Warren Burger spoke 
wisely, and his words recognize that the promotion of interna-
tional trade and investment requires a stable legal infrastruc-
ture upon which the international business community can 
  
 ∗ J.D. (Candidate, December 2002) University of Richmond, School of 
Law; B.S., 1998, Vanderbilt University.  I would like to thank Professors John 
Paul Jones and Daniel Murphy of the University of Richmond School of Law 
and my friends Tarek Azhari, Pamela Coleman, and Violet Cox for their 
encouragement and support throughout my law school experience.  I would 
also like to thank Charles Homiller, Jr., my friend and colleague, for his 
invaluable editing assistance during an earlier draft of this note.  Finally, I 
would like to thank Professor Kevin Clermont for introducing me to this topic 
during his International Litigation course offered at the 2001 Cornell Law 
School Institute of International and Comparative Law. 
 1. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). 
 2. Id. at 9. 
I 
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rely.3  That infrastructure includes some sort of reliability relat-
ing to the enforcement of foreign judgments.  Because of the 
need for certainty, the U.S. and forty-eight other countries have 
begun the negotiation of a treaty that will ensure that judg-
ments issued in the courts of one signatory country will be en-
forced in the courts of other signatory countries.4  The proposed 
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of For-
eign Judgments5 (“Hague Convention” or “Convention”) ad-
dresses an important need internationally and has sparked a 
debate in the U.S. over the need to federalize U.S. law concern-
ing the enforcement of foreign judgments.6 
In the U.S., the enforcement of foreign judgments is governed 
on the state, not the federal, level.7  In fact, despite the expan-
sion of international business and trade, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has spoken only once on the issue of the enforcement of 
foreign judgments, in Hilton v. Guyot.8  In that decision, the 
Court outlined the U.S.’s attitude toward the decrees of foreign 
courts.9  Hilton, though, is not binding law in the U.S.10 
  
 3. See Antonio F. Perez, The International Recognition of Judgments: The 
Debate Between Private and Public Law Solutions, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 44, 
44 (2001). 
 4. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Future Hague 
Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2002).  For further information on the history and progress of 
this proposed Hague Convention, see generally Peter H. Pfund, The Project of 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law to Prepare a Convention 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK. J. INT ’L L. 7 (1998).  Related matters of 
importance, which are beyond the scope of this Article, include questions 
about choice of law and personal jurisdiction over foreign litigants.  For a 
discussion of these issues, see generally Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified 
Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 101 (1993). 
 5. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (Oct. 30, 1999), at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html 
[hereinafter Hague Draft]. 
 6. See Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge 
for the ALI: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International Treaty, 
and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635, 635 (2000). 
 7. Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman, U.S. of America, in 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE  123, 123 (Charles Platto & 
William G. Horton eds., 2nd ed. 1993). 
 8. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
 9. Id. at 202–03. 
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The American Law Institute has begun to draft federal legis-
lation on this issue, following cues from the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law (“Hague Conference”).11  Any such 
law will contain an important provision known as the “public 
policy exception.”12  This provision creates an escape route that 
allows a sovereign to refuse enforcement of an otherwise valid 
foreign judgment when that judgment is contrary to the enforc-
ing nation’s public policy.  Thus, the infrastructure needed to 
promote international trade is in place, but nations have a way 
to avoid enforcing judgments that they are opposed to because 
of some aspect of the foreign judgment. 
It is important that such a provision be carefully constructed, 
so that it can only be interpreted narrowly.  This is especially 
crucial should the proposed international convention ever be 
finalized, giving nations only a small opportunity to deny en-
forcement.  A narrow construction would help avoid the “paro-
chial concept” that Chief Justice Burger spoke of in M/S Bre-
men v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.13  Even if the international conven-
tion is tabled for now, as appears to be the fate of the conven-
tion in question,14 such narrow construction in any federal law 
is important in order to show the international arena what the 
U.S. finds acceptable.  Furthermore, it will give the interna-
tional business community a sense that its judgments will be 
enforced uniformly across the U.S., and it will give that same 
community incentive to encourage other sovereigns to enforce 
U.S. judgments. 
This article proposes the direction that any federal statute 
concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments should take.  
First, this article addresses the need to federalize the enforce-
ment of foreign judgments.  Second, this article surveys the cur-
rent state of the law concerning the enforcement of foreign 
judgments.  Third, this article explores the public policy excep-
  
 10. See Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 123.   
 11. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 635–36. 
 12. Id. at 643. 
 13. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). 
 14. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Pro-
posed Hague Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 
203 (2001); James Love, Hague Diplomatic Conference Ends, Badly for Now, 
CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, June 20, 2001, at 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/info-policy-notes/2001q2/000038.html.   
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tion to enforcement, as used in the U.S. and in Germany.15  Fi-
nally, this article makes a recommendation as to which direc-
tion any federal statute on the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments should take, regarding the public policy exception.    
II. THE NEED TO FEDERALIZE THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS 
The international recognition and enforcement of judgments 
play important roles in facilitating trade.  A guarantee of en-
forcement and recognition provides, to those participating in 
international trade, a certain security that legal rights will be 
enforced and adequate remedies provided.16   However, there is 
no global guarantee.17  For judgments flowing from U.S. courts, 
there is no guarantee at all.18   
Despite this, “the U.S. — without benefit of any treaties or 
federal statute — [is] among the most receptive nations with 
regard to recognition and enforcement of foreign-country judg-
ments.”19  The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution20 dictates that the judgment of any U.S. court will have 
the same force in every court within the U.S. as it would have 
  
 15. The scope of this Article is limited to the enforcement of foreign 
judgments without the privilege of any international treaty.  The analysis 
compares the U.S. use of public policy, see infra text accompanying notes 87–
135, and Germany’s use of public policy, see infra text accompanying notes 
136–78.  This limited comparison makes the assumption that the policy of 
Germany is indicative of the policies of other European countries and of civil 
law regimes. 
 16. Perez, supra note 3, at 44.    
 17. Unless a country has an enforcement treaty with the country in which 
the judgment in question originated, enforcement comes about only because of 
comity, which is “[t]he extent to which the law of one nation . . . shall be 
allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation.”  Hilton v. Guyot, 
159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).  The best example of a multilateral enforcement 
treaty is the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments, 1968 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels Convention], which is a 
multilateral treaty whose membership is comprised of the members of the 
European Union.   
 18. The U.S. is not a party to any international treaties that would ensure 
the enforcement of its judgments abroad.  Karen Minehan, The Public Policy 
Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis?, 18 
LOY. L.A. INT ’L & COMP. L. REV. 795, 798 (1996). 
 19. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 123. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  
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in the rendering court.21  Though the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause applies only to judgments from courts of the U.S., the 
U.S. tradition of almost automatic enforcement extends to for-
eign-country judgments.22  However, no federal law on the sub-
ject exists, nor is the U.S. party to any treaty with a foreign 
country that gives the U.S. an obligation to enforce the judg-
ment of a foreign court.23 
In 1992, the U.S. proposed that the Hague Conference begin 
discussions for an international convention on international 
jurisdiction and foreign judgments in civil and commercial mat-
ters.24  Four years later, those discussions began,25 and in June 
of 1999 a provisional draft convention was adopted.26  The pro-
posed convention has been modeled after the Brussels Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters,27 in force among the members of the 
European Union since 1968.28  Like the Brussels Convention, 
the Hague Convention seeks to create a standard equivalent to 
“Full Faith and Credit” for the judgments of signatory countries 
in the courts of other signatory countries.29  However, negotia-
tions at the Hague have not been finalized,30 and commentators 
question whether the convention will ever come to fruition.31   
Whether or not the convention comes about, it — and the dis-
cussion it has sparked — remains important.  In the U.S., the 
  
 21. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 123. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Pfund, supra note 4, at 8.   
 25. Id.  
 26. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Future Hague 
Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2002). 
 27. Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda Silberman, Memorandum, Proposal for 
Project on Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, Nov. 30, 1998, at 
http://www.ali.org/. 
 28. See Brussels Convention, supra note 17.  As of March 1, 2002, the 
Brussels Convention will be transformed into a European Union Regulation.  
See generally Council Regulation 2001/44/EC on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
2001 O.J. (L 12) 1.  That brings no changes to this discussion. 
 29. See Burbank, supra note 14, at 204. 
 30. See, e.g., Love, supra note 14.   
 31. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 14, at 203; Silberman & Lowenfeld, 
supra note 6, at 635–36. 
File: Hicks Base  Macro  final.doc Created on:  10/30/2002 9:27 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:24 PM 
160 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:1 
Convention has been the impetus for a new project at the 
American Law Institute that involves preparing a draft of a 
federal statute on the enforcement of foreign judgments.32  Cur-
rently in the U.S., state law governs the enforcement of foreign 
judgments, thus creating a sense of uncertainty for foreigners.33  
The U.S. can overcome this uncertainty by creating a federal 
standard.34   
In doing so, Congress should overcome a shortcoming of simi-
lar legislation.35  All agreements making mandatory the en-
forcement of another sovereign’s judgments have a public policy 
exception, whereby the enforcing court is not required to enforce 
any judgment that frustrates the enforcing state’s public pol-
icy.36  The draft convention includes such a provision in order to 
encourage the adoption of the convention.37   However, past in-
ternational agreements have left the exception open to wide and 
varied interpretation, thus limiting the security an interna-
tional agreement could provide to each state’s construction of 
the public policy exception.38  Any federal legislation the U.S. 
promulgates on this front should narrowly define the public pol-
icy exception and bind it to a reciprocity clause.  Such legisla-
tion will then be in place to provide a model of the U.S. stan-
dard for any bi-lateral or multi-lateral enforcement treaties the 
U.S. may join in the future. 
  
 32. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 635. 
 33. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 123. 
 34. Congress preempted state law in a similar area when it enacted the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which created federal standards for the 
enforcement of arbitral awards.  Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 
(1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2000)).   
 35. Both the New York Convention, see infra note 38, and the Brussels 
Convention, see supra note 17, have aims similar to the proposed Hague 
Convention and similar to that of the draft legislation being prepared by the 
American Law Institute.  See also infra notes 77–100. 
 36. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 643. 
 37. Hague Draft, supra note 5, at art. 28(1)(f). 
 38. The use of the public policy exception appearing in the United Nations 
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards illustrates 
this point.  See generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter New York Convention]. 
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III.  THE STATE OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE U.S. 
There is only one universal principal regarding the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments — no judgment will 
be recognized if the court rendering judgment did so without a 
valid basis of jurisdiction.39  The U.S. is the most receptive of 
the major countries in recognizing and enforcing foreign judg-
ments.40  However, state law, not federal law, governs the en-
forcement and recognition of foreign judgments.41   
A.  Hilton v. Guyot 
The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken in the area of the en-
forcement of foreign judgments only once, in 1895.42  French 
citizens brought an action in the Southern District of New York 
to enforce a judgment rendered in France against their former 
co-partners, who were U.S. citizens.43  In Hilton, the Court de-
fined “comity of nations” as “[t]he extent to which the law of one 
nation . . . shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of 
another nation.”44  Under notions of comity, the Court defined 
the conditions under which the final judgment of a foreign na-
tion would be recognized in the U.S.: 
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial 
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the 
trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary 
appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurispru-
dence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice 
between the citizens of its own country and those of other 
countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the 
court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or 
fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason 
why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the 
  
 39. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD , INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 
368 (1993). 
 40. See id. 
 41. Though a survey of how different countries view foreign judgments 
would be interesting and relevant, this Article is limited to the effect of 
foreign judgments in U.S. courts as compared to how U.S. judgments fair in 
foreign courts.  For a concise survey of how this procedure operates in other 
jurisdictions, see ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE (Charles 
Platto & William G. Horton eds., 2d ed. 1993). 
 42. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
 43. Hilton v. Guyot, 42 F. 249, 249 (C.C.N.Y. 1890). 
 44. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163. 
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merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this 
country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial 
or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the 
judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.45 
In addition to the requirements outlined above, the Court 
stated that when the foreign court’s decision was in opposition 
to the policy of the enforcing court, then the enforcing court 
“will prefer the laws of its own country to that of the stranger.”46 
Ultimately, the French judgment was not enforced because 
“international law [was] founded upon mutuality and reciproc-
ity,” and this reciprocity did not exist.47  In other words, the 
Court held that an otherwise valid foreign judgment should not 
be conclusive on the merits unless there was “actual proof” that 
a judgment of the enforcing court would be given the same 
treatment in the foreign country from which the judgment to be 
enforced was issued.48 
In sum, Hilton requires that the following be shown before a 
foreign judgment can be recognized in a court of the U.S.: (1) 
the foreign court’s grounds for personal jurisdiction and for sub-
ject matter jurisdiction; (2) that proper notice was given to all 
parties; (3) that the foreign proceedings were conducted in an 
impartial manner; (4) that there was no fraud in the foreign 
proceeding; (5) that the foreign judgment was final; and (6) that 
enforcing the foreign judgment would not be contrary to the 
public policy of the enforcing court.49 
However, Hilton does not control.50  Justice Cuthbert W. 
Pound, who sat on the New York State Court of Appeals in 
1928, first questioned whether Hilton was precedent binding on 
state courts, in Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlan-
tique.51  In his opposition to the argument that “questions of 
international relations and the comity of nations [were] to be 
determined by the Supreme Court of the U.S.,” Justice Pound 
stated that the question of enforcement “[was] one of private 
  
 45. Id. at 202–03. 
 46. Id. at 164–65 (quoting JOSEPH STORY , COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT 
OF LAWS § 28 (3d ed. 1846)). 
 47. Id. at 228. 
 48. Id. at 227–28. 
 49. Id. at 202–03. 
 50. LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 390. 
 51. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123 
(N.Y. 1926). 
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rather than public international law.”52  As such, “[a] right ac-
quired under a foreign judgment may be established in this 
State [New York] without reference to the rules of evidence laid 
down by the courts of the U.S.”53  This view became widely ac-
cepted in the U.S.54  Regardless, Erie Railroad Company v. 
Tompkins55 invalidated Hilton56 by denying the application of 
federal common law for a federal court sitting in diversity.57  
However, Hilton remains representative of the law in the U.S.  
The governing law is now dictated at the state level, with most 
states generally agreeing with the principles of Hilton except on 
the requirement of reciprocity.58 
B. The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Act  
In 1962, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws completed the Uniform Foreign Money Judg-
ments Recognition Act (“Uniform Act”).59  The Uniform Act codi-
fied the common law, thereby increasing the likelihood that 
U.S. judgments will be recognized in countries that have recip-
rocity requirements for enforcement.60  As of October 2002, 
thirty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands have implemented the Uniform Act in some form.61  In 
  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 390. 
 55. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 56. LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 390.   
 57. Erie, 304 U.S. at 76–78. 
 58. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 636. 
 59. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOG. ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263 (Supp. 
1998), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/ 
ufmjra62.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) [hereinafter UNIFORM ACT].  For in-
formation about the Conference, see Uniform Law Commissioners, The Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, at www.nccusl.org 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2002).   
 60. Robert B. von Mehren & Michael E. Patterson, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments in the U.S., 6 LAW & POL’Y INT ’L 
BUS. 37, 42 (1974). 
 61. For a listing of the states that have codified the Uniform Act, see 
Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the . . . Uniform Foreign 
Money Judgments Recognition Act, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/ 
uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufmjra.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2002). 
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states that have not formally adopted the Uniform Act, its prin-
ciples are usually applied.62 
The Uniform Act defines a foreign judgment as “any judg-
ment of a foreign state granting or denying the recovery of a 
sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other 
penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family 
matters.”63  For enforcement in the U.S., the Uniform Act re-
quires that the foreign judgment be final,64 “but the fact that a 
judgment is subject to appeal . . . does not deprive it of the 
character of final judgment for the purposes of recognition or 
enforcement.”65  Furthermore, the Act makes clear that a for-
eign judgment is not conclusive if the foreign court fails to pro-
vide impartial tribunals and procedures that provide due proc-
ess safeguards.66  Similarly, a foreign judgment cannot be con-
sidered conclusive if the foreign court lacked “personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant”67 or jurisdiction “over the subject mat-
ter” of the case at hand.68  In addition, the Act provides several 
discretionary grounds by which the enforcing court can refuse 
recognition.69 
Discretionary grounds of refusal include the lack of proper 
notice to the defendant,70 the presence of fraud in obtaining the 
judgment,71 or the failure of the foreign court in refusing to rec-
ognize a contractually agreed-upon forum selection clause.72  In 
addition, a court may refuse enforcement when the cause of ac-
tion from which the judgment arises “is repugnant to the public 
policy of [the enforcing] state.”73  In application, the law as codi-
fied by the Uniform Act does not differ greatly from the guide-
lines laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton.74 
  
 62. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 124. 
 63. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 59, § 1. 
 64. Id. § 2. 
 65. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 125. 
 66. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 59, § 4(a)(1). 
 67. Id. § 4(a)(2). 
 68. Id. § 4(a)(3). 
 69. See id. § 4(b). 
 70. Id. § 4(b)(1). 
 71. Id. § 4(b)(2). 
 72. Id. § 4(b)(5). 
 73. Id. § 4(b)(3). 
 74. See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); UNIFORM ACT, supra 
note 59. 
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Even where the Uniform Act has been enacted, the states dif-
fer on the need for a reciprocity requirement.75  In Hilton, it was 
the lack of reciprocity in France that stopped the U.S. Supreme 
Court from enforcing the French judgment.76  It was also recip-
rocity that worried Justice Pound in Compagnie Générale 
Transatlantique.77 The majority of states and the Uniform Act  
follow Justice Pound and reject “any requirement of reciproc-
ity.”78 
IV.  THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
No bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreement on the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments will require a state to 
commit itself to recognize a judgment that would be contrary to 
the public policy of the foreign state.79  This limitation exists 
both in the Brussels Convention80 and in the New York Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (“New York Convention”).81  Traditionally, this excep-
tion has been left undefined, to be interpreted according to the 
desires of the court.82  Below is a survey of cases in which public 
policy played a role in the decision whether to enforce a foreign 
court’s judgment or an arbitration award. 
  
 75. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 636–37. 
 76. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 228; see supra text accompanying notes 47–48. 
 77. Johnston v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123 
(N.Y. 1926). 
 78. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 636. 
 79. The draft convention makes discretionary the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments when such “would be manifestly 
incompatible with the public policy of the State addressed.” Hague Draft, 
supra note 5, at art. 28(1)(f). 
 80. The Brussels Convention does not require recognition of an otherwise 
enforceable judgment when such recognition would be “contrary to public 
policy in the State in which recognition is sought.” Brussels Convention, supra 
note 17, at art. 27 (1). 
 81. The New York Convention does not require enforcement of an 
otherwise enforceable arbitral award when such enforcement would be 
“contrary to the public policy” of the enforcing country.  New York Convention, 
supra note 38, art. 5(1)(b). 
 82. See, e.g., Parsons & Whitemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale 
de L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(determining that the public policy exception of the New York Convention 
should be interpreted narrowly). 
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A.  Public Policy As Applied in the U.S. 
Although every state reserves the right to refuse enforcement 
of a foreign judgment that is contrary to public policy, there are 
few cases that deny recognition on the grounds of public policy 
alone.83  The leading case on the public policy exception, Par-
sons & Whitemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale de 
L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA),84 was decided in the context of 
the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.85  However, the 
holding also applies to the enforcement of foreign judgments.86 
1.  The Public Policy Exception According to Parsons 
In Parsons, the dispute arose out of a delay in the construc-
tion of an Egyptian paper mill for Société Générale de 
L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) (“RAKTA”) that an American 
company, Parsons & Whitemore Overseas Co. (“Overseas”), was 
to build.87  Before the contract was completed, Egypt severed 
diplomatic ties with the U.S.88  Overseas then abandoned the 
project and “notified RAKTA that it regarded this postponement 
as excused by the [contract’s] force majeure clause.”89  RAKTA, 
not agreeing that the delay was excused, began arbitral pro-
ceedings seeking damages for breach of contract.90  The arbitra-
tion panel found that the force majeure clause only excused 
some of the delay and that necessary effort had not been made 
to complete the contract.91  Damages in excess of $300,000 were 
subsequently awarded to RAKTA.92 
In enforcement proceedings in the U.S., Overseas defended 
using the public policy exception of the New York Convention.93  
  
 83. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 129. 
 84. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 85. Id. at 969. 
 86. See, e.g., Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 129; Michael L. 
Morkin, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments in 
Illinois, 85 ILL. B.J. 364, 367–68 (1997). 
 87. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 972. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  The force majeure clause was designed to excuse performance 
delay when the cause was beyond Overseas’ reasonable capacity to control.  
Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 973. 
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That exception allows the enforcing court to refuse enforcement 
where “enforcement of the award would violate the public policy 
of [the enforcing] country.”94  The court determined that the 
public policy defense should be construed narrowly95 and en-
forced the award.96 
Overseas sought to equate U.S. public policy with U.S. na-
tional policy.97  The court rejected this argument, because to do 
otherwise would create “a major loophole” against the aims of 
the New York Convention.98  The rule, as created by the Par-
sons court, is that otherwise enforceable foreign arbitration 
awards will be enforced unless “enforcement would violate the 
forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.”99 Be-
cause this defense is so rarely raised, the rule of Parsons 
stands.  The U.S. Supreme Court has no cases on point, and the 
federal appellate courts have only five, including Parsons.100  
Each of those quotes the “most basic notions of morality and 
justice”101 language of Parsons and then rejects public policy as 
a method to deny enforcement based on the case at hand.102 
2.  Public Policy As Applied to the Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments 
As noted earlier, courts rarely use the public policy exception 
to deny enforcement.103  When the exception is raised, it is in-
  
 94. Id. at 972; see New York Convention, supra note 38, art. 5(1)(b). 
 95. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974. 
 96. Id. at 978. 
 97. Id. at 974.   
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310 (2d 
Cir. 1998); Waterside Ocean Navigation v. Int’l Navigation, 737 F.2d 150 (2d 
Cir. 1984); Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691 (2d 
Cir. 1978); Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 101. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974. 
 102. Europcar Italia, S.p.A., 156 F.3d at 313; Waterside Ocean Navigation, 
737 F.2d at 152; Andros Compania Maritima, 579 F.2d at 699; Fotochrome, 
Inc., 517 F.2d at 516. 
 103. See supra text accompanying note 90; Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald 
T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested 
Approach, 81 HARV. L.  REV. 1601, 1670 (1968); see also Monrad G. Paulsen & 
Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws , 56 COLUM . L. REV. 
969, 1015–16 (1956) (voicing concerns about the use of the public policy 
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frequently found to be the sole basis to preclude the recognition 
of a foreign judgment.104 
In Tahan v. Hodgson,105 the court refused to find that a dif-
ference in procedure amounted to a violation of public policy.106  
The case involved the enforcement of an Israeli default judg-
ment.107  In that proceeding, the defendant was not given the 
same notice that he would have received in a U.S. court.108  The 
court did not feel this violated public policy because the notice 
procedures utilized by the Israeli court were not “repugnant to 
fundamental notions of what is decent and just.”109 
In Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger,110 the district 
court rejected the public policy argument, a judgment that the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.111  In 
that case, a Belgian court had chosen to apply Belgian law to an 
employment dispute, despite a contractual agreement to apply 
Illinois law to the dispute.112  The court held that there was no 
violation of public policy because it was not clearly inappropri-
ate for the Belgian court to have applied Belgian law.113  When 
enforcing the judgment, the district court went on to note that 
they may have reached the same conclusion about choice of law 
had they been “faced with the issue.”114 
In Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.,115 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a decision 
  
defense in order to apply local law in situations where there are local 
contacts). 
 104. See Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The 
standard [to meet the public policy exception] is high, and infrequently met.”); 
Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 866 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the 
public policy exception should apply “[o]nly in clear-cut cases”); Loucks v. 
Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918) (“We are not so provincial as 
to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it 
otherwise at home.”). 
 105. 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 106. Id. at 866 n.18. 
 107. Id. at 862. 
 108. Id. at 866. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 631 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 111. Id. at 318. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971). 
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that enforced a default judgment obtained in England.116  The 
public policy defense was raised regarding the decision of the 
British court to award attorneys’ fees.117  The defendant argued 
that because Pennsylvania law did not allow recovery of attor-
neys’ fees, the British judgment granting such fees should not 
be enforced as it violated public policy.118  The court easily dis-
missed that argument, stating that the public policy exception 
applied only when enforcement would clearly “injure the public 
health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of 
the administration of the law, or . . . undermine that sense of 
security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of 
private property, which any citizen ought to feel.”119  To the 
enforcing court, the fact that British law differed with the law 
of the enforcing court was not sufficient to reject enforcement on 
the basis of public policy.120 
3.  When Public Policy Is Grounds to Refuse Enforcement 
Where U.S. courts do find public policy violations, the forum 
court usually has “substantial contacts” with the person or 
transaction involved in the litigation.121  In Laker Airways v. 
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,122 the plaintiff initiated pro-
ceedings in the U.S. seeking an injunction to prevent the defen-
dants from seeking an injunction against the plaintiff in Brit-
ain.123  Though this case did not involve the enforcement of a 
foreign judgment, the court recognized the relationship of an 
anti-suit injunction preventing a judgment from a foreign court 
to an enforcement proceeding.124  The court found that anti-suit 
injunctions were justified when they were needed to “prevent 
litigants’ evasion of the forum’s important public policies.”125  
The court equated this principle to the rule that foreign judg-
ments will not be enforced in the U.S. “when contrary to the 
  
 116. Id. at 444. 
 117. Id. at 439. 
 118. Id. at 443. 
 119. Id. (quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 26 A. 665, 666 (P.A. 1893)). 
 120. Id. at 443. 
 121. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 60, at 63. 
 122. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 123. Id. at 918. 
 124. Id. at 931. 
 125. Id. 
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crucial public policies of the forum in which enforcement is re-
quested.”126   
The holding relevant here is that the forum court has an in-
terest in seeing that its public policy is not evaded.127  Thus, if a 
case were to arise involving the enforcement of a foreign judg-
ment where it is clear that the enforcing court’s public policy 
interests had been circumvented because the plaintiff pursued 
litigation in a foreign court, the court would be justified in using 
public policy to deny enforcement.  In that situation, the inter-
est of the forum court in citing public policy is validated because 
of its relationship to the litigation.128 
In Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, the court refused to enforce a 
British libel judgment on the grounds that to do so would be in 
violation of public policy.129  The Supreme Court of Maryland, 
when asked to certify whether enforcement of the judgment 
would be in violation of Maryland’s public policy, agreed with 
the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia.130  The court 
reasoned that the protections offered by the First Amendment 
“would be seriously jeopardized by the entry of foreign libel 
judgments granted pursuant to standards deemed appropriate 
in England but considered antithetical to the protections af-
forded the press by the U.S. Constitution.”131  The refusal to en-
force the judgment met the concern voiced in Laker Airways: 
that litigants filed suit in a foreign nation in order to circum-
vent the public policy of the U.S.132  Telnikoff recognized that 
the great disparity between the libel law in the U.S. and Britain 
had created a phenomenon where prominent persons who had 
received bad press in the U.S. were flocking to Britain to file 
libel suits.133  The court concluded that to enforce a foreign 
  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 60, at 63. 
 129. Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995); see also 
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) 
(refusing to enforce a British defamation judgment because the British 
defamation law did not comport with the First Amendment).  For a discussion 
of  Bachchan and how the First Amendment plays a role in denying the 
enforcement of foreign judgments, see Craig A. Stern, Foreign Judgments and 
the Freedom of Speech: Look Who’s Talking, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 999 (1994). 
 130. Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 236–37. 
 131. Id. at 250 (quoting Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 664). 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 121–28. 
 133. Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 250. 
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judgment where the law out of which the judgment arose was 
repugnant to the standards of the First Amendment would be in 
violation of the U.S. Constitution.134 
B.  The Public Policy Exception As Applied to U.S. Judgments in 
Germany 
A few key cases from Germany illustrate the danger stem-
ming from the assumption that U.S. law and procedure will be 
applied in the courts of other nations.135  German law requires a 
person to request an order of enforcement of the foreign judg-
ment.136  Section 723 of the German Code of Civil Procedure 
dictates that such an order is to be granted without re-
examination of the substance of the judgment.137  That order is 
to be granted only if the judgment has become final under the 
law of the rendering court.138  However, no order is to be en-
forced if that judgment meets one of the exclusions of section 
328 of the German Code of Civil Procedure.139  The exclusion 
  
 134. Id. at 250–51. 
 135. There is discussion that a fear of the public policy exception is 
unfounded, that other courts follow the U.S. in interpreting the exception 
narrowly.  However, that assumption is not based on sound analysis.  In The 
Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Necessary or 
Nemesis?, Karen Minehan looks at the European Court of Justice’s application 
of the exception as applied to foreign judgments enforced under the authority 
of the Brussels Convention.  Karen Minehan, The Public Policy Exception to 
the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis?, 18 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 795 (1996).  She concludes that Europe construes the 
exception narrowly.  However, her analysis is flawed, because enforcement 
under the Brussels Convention is equivalent to “full faith and credit.”  A 
better analysis would look at the view individual countries have taken toward 
enforcing foreign judgments outside the coverage of the Brussels Convention.   
 136. The provisions of German law governing the enforcement of U.S. 
judgments can be found in the German Code of Civil Procedure at sections 723 
and 328.  §§ 328, 723 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (ZPO).  For a description, in 
English, of the relevant German law, refer to David Westin, Enforcing Foreign 
Commercial Judgments and Arbitral Awards in the U.S., West Germany, and 
England, 19 LAW & POL’Y INT ’L BUS. 325, 339–42 (1987). 
 137. See David Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments and 
Arbitral Awards in the U.S., West Germany, and England, 19 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 325, 339 (1987). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.  Section 328 of the German Code of Civil Procedure does not allow 
the enforcement of foreign judgments in the following circumstances: (1) 
where the court rendering the judgment did not have jurisdiction under 
German law; (2) if the defendant did not participate in the proceeding or 
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relevant to this article does not allow enforcement of judgments 
that are incompatible with the fundamental principles of Ger-
man law. 
1.  P. & Co. Inc. v. T. — Germany 1975 
In P. & Co. Inc. v. T.,140 a West German Federal Supreme 
Court decision dated June 4, 1975, the court refused to enforce 
a judgment issued by a U.S. district court for a New York bro-
kerage house against a German trader.141  The German defen-
dant operated an import/export business in Germany and had 
significant experience in speculative commodities trading on 
foreign exchanges.142  In March 1967, he opened an account 
with a brokerage house.143  After the customer incurred heavy 
losses, the brokerage house closed the customer’s account in 
July 1967, at which point the customer had a deficit of ap-
proximately $73,000.144  The brokerage house brought an action 
against the German customer and obtained a judgment of 
$73,421.71, plus costs of $1,937.77 and interest of $25,385.81.145  
In enforcement proceedings commenced in Germany, the Fed-
eral Supreme Court of Germany refused to enforce the judg-
ment because to do so would be in violation of German public 
policy.146  The Federal Supreme Court based this decision on the 
fact that the customer did not incur any liability for the com-
modities transactions under West German Law because he was 
not authorized to trade in futures under the German Stock Ex-
change Law.147 
  
otherwise defend himself (so default judgments are not enforced in Germany); 
(3) if the judgment is somehow contrary to a domestic judgment or a 
previously enforced foreign judgment; (4) if recognizing the judgment would 
somehow be against German public policy or otherwise incompatible with the 
basic laws of Germany; or (5) if there was no guarantee of reciprocity for a 
German judgment in the nation of the rendering court.  See id. at 339–41. 
 140. P. & Co., Inc. v. T., Judgment of June 4, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, 
BGH, Federal Republic of Germany, [1975] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1600; [1975] Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft AWD 500, translated in 
LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 444. 
 141. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 446. 
 142. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 444. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 444–45. 
 146. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 445–46. 
 147. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 445. 
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2.  Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co. — Germany 1989 
In Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co.,148 the German court refused 
to enforce a judgment initiated in a Massachusetts court and 
finalized upon appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in 1987.149  The plaintiff, an employee of Eastern 
Marking Machine Corporation (“Eastern”), sought damages 
from Eastern and from B. Grauel & Co. (“Grauel”) for injuries 
sustained while she worked with a machine manufactured by 
Grauel.150  On the day of the accident, the plaintiff was operat-
ing the machine, which imprinted information onto electronic 
parts, and one of the parts fell.151  She turned the machine off to 
retrieve the object.152  Accidentally, she “reactivated the ma-
chine,” and the “oscillating arm [of the machine] descended and 
pinned the plaintiff’s wrist to the base of the machine.”153  For 
more than twenty minutes, the plaintiff was trapped.154  The 
accident resulted in permanent injury, leaving the plaintiff with 
impaired grip strength and traumatic sympathetic reflex dys-
trophy.155 
At trial, the jury found that the plaintiff’s employer was not 
negligent.156  They determined that Grauel was ninety-five per-
cent negligent, with the remaining negligence assessed to the 
plaintiff.157  The jury also found Grauel had violated its war-
ranty of merchantability.158  The jury awarded $275,000 to the 
plaintiff;159 final judgment, once adjusted to account for the 
plaintiff’s negligence, was entered at $261,250, plus interest.160  
The appellate court affirmed this award.161 
  
 148. Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co., Landgericht Berlin, June 13, 1989, [1989] 
RIW 988, translated in LOWENFELD, supra note 39, at 440. 
 149. Id., translated in LOWENFELD, supra note 39, at 443; see also Solimene 
v. B. Grauel & Co., 507 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1987). 
 150. Solimene, 507 N.E.2d at 664. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 664–65. 
 155. Id. at 665. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 665 n.5. 
 161. Id. at 670. 
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Once the American judgment was final, the plaintiff com-
menced an enforcement action in Germany,162 for $275,000 plus 
$207,950.50 in interest.163  The action was denied because the 
German court concluded that to enforce the judgment would be 
in “violation of German order public” — enforcement would vio-
late German public policy.164 
The German court found several grounds supporting its posi-
tion.  First, the American judgment did “not contain any writ-
ten statement of reasons” as to why the objections the defen-
dant raised upon appellate review did not result in overturning 
the jury verdict.165  Furthermore, the American court had not 
included a statement explaining the reasoning behind the spe-
cific amount awarded.166  The German court also had difficulty 
with an award given for breach of warranty without proof that 
the product was actually defective.167  The court also disputed 
the award of interest and the “height of the original award of 
damages,” an amount far greater than would have been 
awarded had the case begun in Germany.168  Finally, the Ger-
man court felt that, according to German law, the plaintiff’s 
negligence should have been considered more in assessing dam-
ages.169 
3.  The German Approach Contrasted with the U.S.  
In vast opposition to the construction of the public policy ex-
ception in the U.S.,170 the German court in Solimene  refused 
enforcement because a different result would have occurred in a 
German court.171  In P. & Co. Inc., the German court explicitly 
held that enforcing a U.S. judgment that was in contradiction 
  
 162. Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co., Landgericht Berlin, June 13, 1989, [1989] 
RIW 988, translated in LOWENFELD, supra note 39, at 440. 
 163. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 443. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 444. 
 170. Parsons & Whitemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale de 
L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 87–135. 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 166–71. 
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with German law was against German publ ic policy.172  This 
view of the public policy exception is very broad, and seems to 
indicate a “loophole” that Germany uses to refuse enforcement 
of foreign judgments that somehow purports to violate the law 
of Germany.  It was this type of loophole that the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit took pains to avoid reading into 
the New York Convention when formulating the U.S.’s position 
on the public policy exception in Parsons .173  Regardless, Ger-
many’s position appears to be that foreign judgments — at least 
foreign judgments without the protection of a formal enforce-
ment treaty174 — based on a claim that somehow exceeds or vio-
lates the protections and privileges offered by German law, will 
not be enforced because enforcement would violate German 
public policy.175 
V.  A RECOMMENDATION FOR ANY U.S. FEDERAL LAW ON 
ENFORCEMENT 
As noted previously, the Supreme Court in Hilton felt that re-
ciprocity needed to be shown before a foreign judgment could be 
enforced in a U.S. court.176  Despite this, the Uniform Act does 
not require reciprocity, nor do the majority of states.177  How-
ever, any federal law should have some sort of reciprocity re-
quirement.  
  
 172. P. & Co., Inc. v. T., Judgment of June 4, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, 
BGH, Federal Republic of Germany, [1975] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1600; [1975] Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft AWD 500, translated in 
LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 445–46. 
 173. See Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974; see also supra text accompanying notes 
93–102. 
 174. Though such a discussion goes beyond the scope of this Article, it is 
likely that a judgment issued from a country privileged to have an 
enforcement treaty with Germany would not have merited the scrutiny given 
to the U.S. judgment in Solimene.  For a discussion on this, see Karen 
Minehan, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis?, 18 LOY. L.A. INT ’L & COMP. L. J. 795 
(1996), Minehan’s article includes a discussion of European judgments 
enforced under the protection of the Brussels Convention. 
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 163–70.   
 176. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 47–48. 
 177. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 636; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 81–83. 
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Any federal law on the enforcement of foreign judgments 
should clearly define the public policy exception, so that courts 
will narrowly construe the exception.  The definition stated in 
Parsons — that the public policy exception applies only when 
“enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions 
of morality and justice”178 — provides a working start.  Any re-
ciprocity requirement should be tied to the public policy excep-
tion.  Thus, the result would be that the U.S. reserves the right 
to refuse enforcement of a judgment coming from a country that 
defines public policy more broadly, for example, the German 
definition discussed above.179 
The principle barrier to the enforcement of U.S. judgments in 
foreign courts has been a broad construction of the public policy 
exception.  However, because the U.S. persists in being recep-
tive to enforcing foreign judgments,180 other countries have little 
incentive to change their ways by being more receptive to U.S. 
judgments.181  Thus, the U.S. needs to provide incentives.  If the 
U.S. makes a statement of a change in its policy of liberal en-
forcement, other countries will realize that they need to be more 
receptive to enforcing U.S. judgments. 
Such a statement will also have the effect of giving the U.S. 
more bargaining power at the Hague.  The proposed Hague 
Conference goes beyond the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments.182  It is a double convention, much like the Brussels 
Convention, which defines the foundations for jurisdiction over 
a foreign defendant before addressing the question of recogni-
tion or enforcement.183  With the current state of affairs, and the 
U.S.’s weak bargaining position, the U.S. stands in a position 
where it will be forced to give up, on an international level, 
many grounds for jurisdiction that it holds dear.184 
  
 178. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974. 
 179. See supra notes and text accompanying notes 136–71. 
 180. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 123. 
 181. See supra notes and text accompanying notes 90–135. 
 182. See generally Hague Draft, supra note 5. 
 183. See Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 8, at 638. 
 184. Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 89, 95–96 (1999). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The fate of the proposed Hague Convention on the enforce-
ment of foreign judgments remains unclear.185  However, the 
path the U.S. must take is clear.  The U.S. needs to create a 
federal law governing the enforcement of foreign judgments, a 
process initiated by the American Law Institute.186  The current 
state of negotiations at the Hague puts the U.S. in the unique 
position of being able to increase its bargaining power.  Nego-
tiations are close to stalling.187  In the meantime, the U.S. has 
begun the process of drafting a federal law.188  The final law 
should make a statement expressing a change in U.S. policy 
toward the public policy exception.  The U.S. should be clear 
that it will not continue to enforce judgments from countries 
that refuse to enforce U.S. judgments through use of a broad 
construction of the public policy exception. 
The U.S. has created a standard for the world to follow — 
judgments from foreign courts will be enforced when the foreign 
court provides an impartial tribunal and due process safe-
guards,189 so long as the foreign court has “jurisdiction over the 
defendant”190 and “over the subject matter.”191  The U.S. does 
maintain discretionary grounds for refusal,192 but the U.S. con-
strues those grounds narrowly193 to encourage “[t]he expansion 
of American business and industry.”194  Parsons defined public 
policy in terms of the “most basic notions of morality and jus-
tice,”195 in furtherance of the policy articulated by Chief Justice 
Burger.  That policy has served us well.  However, the words of 
  
 185. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 186. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda Silberman, Memorandum, Proposal 
for Project on Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, at http://www.ali.org/ 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2002). 
 187. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 14, at 203. 
 188. See generally Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6 (discussing the 
American Law Institute project for a federal statute on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments). 
 189. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOG. ACT § 4(a)(1), 13 U.L.A. 263 
(Supp. 1998). 
 190. Id. § 4(a)(2). 
 191. Id. § 4(a)(3). 
 192. See id. § 4(b). 
 193. See generally Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7. 
 194. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). 
 195. Parsons & Whitemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale de 
L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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the Supreme Court in Hilton ring true: “international law is 
founded upon mutuality and reciprocity.”196  The U.S. needs to 
take a stand and tell the world that reciprocity is needed, and 
that valid U.S. judgments should be enforced in foreign courts, 
so as to facilitate the expansion of foreign trade. 
 
  
 196. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895). 
